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Challgenges in Asia

China, India, and War over Water
Jin H. Pak

Abstract: This article examines the likelihood of water insecurity
causing war between China and India. Water insecurity itself will not
likely lead to armed conflict. But when coupled with other international and domestic factors, it could increase the likelihood of war.
China’s water scarcity and its widening north-south water gap have
increased pressure to execute controversial water diversion plans.
These plans will threaten India, especially since the Brahmaputra
River flows through a disputed area. These factors, plus changing
domestic conditions in China, may increase the likelihood of war.

O

ver the past decade, numerous analysts and scholars have speculated about the likelihood of India and China going to war over
water. Some maintain a future “water war” will occur—and
others call such fears overblown.1 These arguments focus on how water
is unevenly distributed and how China’s upstream behaviors, such as its
damming activities, could instigate conflict with its downstream neighbor.
To determine if water scarcity could cause military conflict between
these two states, an extensive analysis of factors affecting relations
between India and China, as well as domestic conditions within China,
are needed. Such analyses suggest water scarcity itself will not likely lead
to war. However, coupled with other factors such as increasing water
scarcity in China, linkages between water scarcity and national sovereignty, and decreasing political stability in the upstream state, war may
become more likely.
The glaciers in China’s Tibet are melting at a faster rate, and coupled
with growing water scarcity and a widening north-south regional water
gap, China will face increasing pressure to implement a controversial
upstream water diversion plan in its western provinces. This plan will
threaten India since the downstream portion of the Brahmaputra River
flows through a disputed area with strong implications for national
sovereignty. Both states will then increase their security postures in an
already heavily militarized border region. As China’s economic growth
continues its downward trajectory, popular nationalism will threaten
the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to pursue a foreign policy
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1     For a concise synopsis of the two opposing arguments, see Sudha Ramachandran, “Water the Kennedy School of
Wars: China, India and the Great Dam Rush,” The Diplomat, April 3, 2015, http://thediplomat. Government at Harvard
com/2015/04/water-wars-china-india-and-the-great-dam-rush/.
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uninfluenced by populism and public opinion. The likely net result: a
likely water war between the two states.

Water Scarcity and its Ties to Conflict

The idea of water security has gained traction over the years, and
is defined as “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of
water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems, and production, coupled with
an acceptable amount of water-related risks to people, environment, and
economies.” This idea includes the negative effects of having too little
water, or “water scarcity,” and damage from having too much water such
as floods, contamination, erosion, and epidemics.2 This article focuses
on the scarcity component of water insecurity and assesses six driving
factors that make it more likely China and India will fight over water
in the future. But, first, let us discuss how water scarcity is related to
conflict.
People can survive plague, war, and natural catastrophes, but they
cannot survive without water. Unfortunately, fresh water is an increasingly scarce and precious resource. Less than 2.5 percent of all water on
earth is fresh water, and more than half of it is trapped in polar ice and
high-altitude glaciers around the world. This precious-little amount is
declining due to increasing consumption, pollution, and climate change.
“Global per capita freshwater availability has unstoppably declined for
more than a century, plummeting more than 60 percent since 1950
alone.”3
At the turn of the millennium in 2000, more than one billion people
could not access clean drinking water.4 According to a recent article
co-authored by the chair of the Department of Water Engineering at
the University of Twente in the Netherlands and a water scarcity expert
from the Johns Hopkins Water Institute, approximately 66 percent of
the world’s population, or more than four billion people, live in areas
under severe water scarcity. Of these four billion people, one billion live
in India, and 900 million live in China; the majority of their populations thus live in areas of severe water scarcity.5 In 2006, a World Bank
Working Paper on water scarcity claimed “China will soon become the
most water-stressed country in East and Southeast Asia.”6
Water scarcity is also linked to food availability. Agriculture accounts
for 70 percent of all global water consumption, compared to 19 percent
for industry and about 11 percent for drinking.7 The Strategic Foresight
2     David Grey and Claudia W. Sadoff, “Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and
Development,” Water Policy 9, No. 6 (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/The World Bank, 2007): 545-546.
3     Brahma Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 60, 62.
4     Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Scarcity and Conflict,” Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy
15, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 28.
5     Mesfin M. Mekonnen and Arjen Y. Hoekstra, “Four Billion People Facing Severe Water
Scarcity,” Science Advances 2, no. 2 (February 12, 2016): 3. The two authors assessed water scarcity on a
monthly basis using a ratio between water consumption and water availability. A water scarcity (WS)
ratio of greater than 2.0 meant consumption far exceeded water availability and severe water scarcity.
By their calculations, more than four billion people live in areas with a WS score greater than 2.0.
6     Zmarak Shalizi, “Addressing China’s Growing Water Shortages and Associated Social and
Environmental Consequences,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper - Vol. 3895 (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, April 2006): 5.
7     Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 64.
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Group, a prominent India-based think tank that publishes extensively
on climate change and environmental issues, projects both India and
China will face a 30 to 50 percent decline in rice and wheat yields by
2050 due to “the cumulative effect[s] of water scarcity, glacial melting,
disruptive precipitation patterns, flooding, desertification, pollution,
and soil erosion.”8
Brahma Chellaney, Professor for Strategic Studies at the New
Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and a noted scholar on water
security, asserts water is now the world’s most extracted resource.9 In
fact, water is already more expensive than oil. According to the US
Energy Information Agency, the average retail price for gasoline for all
grades in the United States on February 1, 2016 was $1.93 per gallon, or
$0.51 per liter, well below the retail price US consumers pay for a liter
of water.10
In the scholarly literature regarding water security, one common
refrain is, “no nations have ever gone to war strictly over access to water,
nor are any likely to do so in the future.”11 Juha Uitto, at the United
Nations Human Development Program, and Aaron Wolf, professor of
geography at Oregon State University, find only one war was fought over
water, and only seven cases exist of acute water-related violence between
states.12 Moreover, there have been more than 3,600 water-related treaties over the years, reflecting a strong record of cooperation.13
Yet, there is a growing body of work suggesting water security will
cause war. Peter Gleick theorizes environmental security issues will
become a more dominant part of international discourse in the postCold War era. He claims rapid population growth, increased migration,
greater demands on environmental resources, and future climactic
changes will increase international tensions over shared fresh-water
resources.
In 1978, when Ethiopia publicized its intention to construct dams in
the upstream section of the Nile River, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat
said, “We depend upon the Nile 100 percent in our life, so if anyone,
at any moment, thinks to deprive us of our life, we shall never hesitate
[to go to war] because it is a matter of life or death.”14 Furthermore,
8     Stratetic Foresight Group, The Himalayan Challenge: Water Security in Emerging Asia (Mumbai:
Strategic Foresight Group, 2010): iv.
9     Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 5.
10     “Weekly Retail US Gasoline and Diesel Prices,” US Energy Information Agency Independent
Statistics and Analysis, February 1, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_
NUS_W.htm (accessed February 7, 2016).
11     Jack A. Goldstone, “Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to
Violent Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 8.
12     Juha I. Uitto and Aaron T. Wolf, “Water Wars? Geographical Perspectives: Introduction,”
The Geographical Journal 168, no. 4 (December 2002): 289. The seven cases are: between India and
Pakistan in 1948 over access to the Indus basin; between Syria and Israel in 1951 over Israeli water
projects in the Huleh Basin; between Egypt and Sudan in 1958 over the Nile River; between Somalia
and Ethiopia in 1963-1964 over water in the Ogaden Desert; between Israel and Syria in 1965-1966
over Arab plans to divert the Jordan River; between Iraq and Syria in 1975 over the Euphrates River;
and between Mauritania and Senegal in 1989-1991 over grazing rights along the Senegal River; and
Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2
(January 1998): 256.
13     Uitto and Wolf, “Water Wars? 289; and Todd Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and Its
Implications for Domestic and International Stability,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 37, no. 2
(April-June 2010): 77.
14     Peter H. Gleick, “Environment and Security: The Clear Connections,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 47, no. 3 (April 1991): 17, 20.

56

Parameters 46(2) Summer 2016

water has contributed to fighting in the Middle East between Israel and
its Arab neighbors for decades. Located in one of the driest areas on
Earth, Israel relies on the Jordan River for much of its water, a resource
it shares with the four other riparian states: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and
the Palestinian Authority.15
In the late 1950s, Israel began a project to divert water away from the
Jordan River for distribution elsewhere in Israel. Arab states responded
with their own project to divert water into Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
In 1964, the year the Arab project was supposed to commence, the first
of a series of border clashes between Israel and Syria occurred that
targeted water facilities. These clashes contributed to the state of heightened tensions between Israel and the Arab states during which time
Egypt mobilized its military along the Sinai Peninsula. Israel responded
with a preemptive attack, and the 1967 Six-Day War.16
Rebecca Lowe and Emily Silvester’s report on water shortages
threatening global security argues water can spark conflict when other
destabilizing factors already exist: “combine water scarcity with political instability, increasing resource demands and climate change, and
the ‘perfect storm’ for conflict can be created.”17 While water can help
cause war, it is surely not the sole reason for a war: “when territorial
disputes overlap with water wrangles—as has been the case in a number
of prominent post-World War II feuds—water is usually an underlying
driver, rather than an overt instigator of conflicts.”18 Miriam Lowi, noted
scholar on water scarcity in the Middle East, argues the geographical
positions of states along a transboundary river system also affect the level
of cooperation over water distribution—with clear advantages going to
the upstream state which could use the water unilaterally without regard
to the needs of the downstream state.19
Despite considerable evidence of cooperation over water usage, a
number of arguments link water scarcity and armed conflict. While states
have not fought exclusively over access to water, increased water scarcity,
when combined with other factors such as upstream-downstream positioning, sovereignty linkages, and political instability, may lead to war.
These factors provide the foundation for examining the driving factors
linking water security to the possibility of war between China and India:

15     Meredith Giordano, Mark Giordano, and Aaron Wolf, “The Geography of Water Conflict
and Cooperation: Internal Pressures and International Manifestations,” The Geographical Journal 168,
no. 4 (December 2002): 295.
16     Miriam R. Lowi, “Water and Conflict in the Middle East and South Asia: Are Environmental
Issues and Security Issues Linked?” The Journal of Environment and Development 8, no. 4 (December
1999): 387.
17     Rebecca Lowe and Emily Silvester, “Water Shortages Threaten Global Security,” International
Bar Association Global Insight 68, no. 4 (August 2014): 48.
18     Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 54.
19     Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 10.
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China’s growing water scarcity.
China’s future upstream activity.
Sino-Indian dispute over Arunachal Pradesh.
Increasing political instability in China.

Driving Factor #1: China’s Growing Water Scarcity

China’s Tibetan plateau, nestled in the Himalayas, is the source
of Asia’s 10 major river systems, including the Yellow, Yangtze, Indus,
Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Salween, and Mekong. It is no wonder many refer
to Tibet as the “Water Tower of Asia.” These rivers traverse 11 countries
and support 2 billion people stretching from Afghanistan to India in
South Asia, and to Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Due to its upstream position, China enjoys a potential monopoly over the supply of fresh water
for most of South and Southeast Asia. In the case of India, both the
Indus and Brahmaputra Rivers flow downstream from China into its
borders. In fact, China is the source of more transnational water flows
than any other upstream power in the world.20

Major Rivers Sourced in Tibet 21

Consequently, despite the wealth of water in Tibet, China faces an
emerging water crisis further aggravated by overuse and pollution. In
2004, China’s available water per capita was one of the lowest in the
world for a populous country, just one-third of the average for developing countries, one-fourth of the world average, and one-fifth of the US
average. This comparison reflects a 23 percent decline in China’s available water per capita over the past 20 years. Meanwhile, the demand for
20     Of all the major rivers originating in the Himalayas, only the Ganges River originates outside
of Tibet. See Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and its Implications for Domestic and International
Stability,” 78; Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 231; Uttam Kumar Sinha, “Examining China’s HydroBehavior: Peaceful or Assertive?” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 42; Lowe and Silvester,
“Water Shortages Threaten Global Security,” 45; and Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 231.
21     Major Rivers Sourced in Tibet [Map]. Climate Change and Its Impact on our World’s Major
Rivers – Part 1: The Rivers of Asia, 21st Century Tech, September 4, 2013, http://www.21stcentech.
com/climate-change-impact-major-rivers-asia/ (accessed December 1, 2015).
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water is growing more than 10 percent annually in Chinese cities—and
more than five percent annually for its industries.22
This precipitous decline in available water has worsened an already
critical shortage in drinking water for China’s huge population. More
than 25 percent of all Chinese are without access to drinking water.
Almost half of China’s 668 largest cities are short of water with 108
identified as “serious” and 60 as “critical.” By 2030, the Chinese government predicts the country’s annual freshwater shortage will reach 200
billion cubic meters.23
China’s worsening water shortage is exacerbated by increased pollution on a historic scale. More than 90 percent of China’s underground
aquifers, which supply 70 percent of the country’s drinking water, are
polluted. More than half of China’s population drinks water contaminated with organic waste. More than 75 percent of surface water flowing
along China’s rivers is unsafe for drinking or fishing, and 30 percent is
unsuitable for agriculture and industry.24
China’s water problem has a stark regional dimension as well; the
south has the preponderance of water while the north has the higher
demand. This has created a significant regional disparity that is getting
worse with time. While 45 percent of China’s population and 60 percent
of its agriculture are in the north, the region has only 13.8 percent of
the fresh water. In per capita terms, the amount of available water in the
north is about 25 percent of that available in the south.25

Driving Factor #2: China’s Future Upstream Activity

To remedy the great north-south water divide, China started a
massive South-North Water Diversion Project to transfer a total of 38
to 48 billion cubic meters of water annually. Officially announced by
China’s State Council in 2002, the project called for diverting waters
along three different routes—an eastern route, a central route, and a
western route. The water diversion projects along the first two routes
are already completed and are transferring water from China’s Yangtze
and Han Rivers in the south to the Yellow River in the north. The
third route is still under development. It will divert tributaries to the
upstream portion of the Yangtze River in western China to the Yellow
River. However, in the last 30 years, Chinese scholars and officials have
proposed going above and beyond this project by diverting water from

22     Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China’s Environmental
Crisis,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 86, no. 5 (September 2007); Shalizi, “Addressing China’s Growing Water
Shortages and Associated Social and Environmental Consequences,” 4-5; and Kathleen Cannon,
“Water as a Source of Conflict and Instability in China,” Strategic Analysis 30, no. 2 (April-June 2006):
310.
23     Ibid., 312; Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and its Implications for Domestic and
International Stability,” 72-73.
24     Cannon, “Water as a Source of Conflict and Instability in China,” 313; and Economy, “The
Great Leap Backward?”
25     Sebastian Biba, “Desecuritization in China’s Behavior Towards Its Transboundary Rivers: The
Mekong River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers,” Journal of Contemporary China 23,
no. 85 (2014): 30; and Shalizi, “Addressing China’s Growing Water Shortages and Associated Social
and Environmental Consequences,” 7.
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the upstream portions of the Mekong, Salween, and Yarlung Tsangpo
Rivers that flow from China’s Tibet.26
India views this additional diversion plan with great trepidation because it would affect the downstream flow of water into the
Brahmaputra River; the Yarlung Tsangpo River becomes the Brahmaputra
River once it flows across the Indian border.27 The Brahmaputra River
holds special importance for India. First, it accounts for almost 29
percent of all surface water in India’s rivers. Second, it encompasses
roughly 44 percent of India’s total hydropower potential. Of course,
China’s upstream activities will reduce both the run off and hydropower
potential India could expect from the Brahmaputra River. Considering
India’s population is expected to grow by another 500 million by 2050,
it is no surprise water diversion is a serious issue.28
Thus far, the Chinese government has not officially approved plans
to divert the Yarlung Tsangpo River. However, India remains concerned about China’s future intentions. In 1999, China’s State Council
established a special task force of experts from the Ministry of Water
Resources, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Science Academy,
and other agencies, to conduct a major field study of the Grand Western
Water Diversion Plan (GWWDP). After a 36-day field research trip, the
task force published a report in support of the water diversion plans
outlined in the GWWDP.29 After listening to the report in October
2012, General Zhao Nanqi, deputy chairman of the ninth Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference and a former president of the
Military Academy of Sciences, stated, “Even if we do not begin this
water diversion project, the next generation will. Sooner or later it will be
done.”30 In 2005, Li Lang, an officer from China’s second artillery corps,
published a widely read book which listed various reasons and options
for diverting the Yarlung Tsangpo River.31
Many Chinese experts have refuted the technical feasibility of the
Grand Western Water Diversion Plan. In 2000, the minister of water
resources told China’s state council the project was technically and economically impossible, and his successor echoed these concerns. In 2006,
China’s Engineering Academy, in consultation with numerous academics and experts, produced a report refuting the findings from the 1999
26     Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and its Implications for Domestic and International
Stability,” 74; Kiki Zhao, “Water From China’s South-North Transfer Project Flows to Beijing,”
The New York Times, December 25, 2014, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/waterfrom-chinas-south-north-transfer-project-flows-to-beijing/; and Hongzhou Zhang, “Sino-Indian
Water Disputes: The Coming Water Wars?” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Water 3 (October 2015): 4.
27     The Brahmaputra River, India’s longest river, originates in the Chemayungdung Glacier on
the slopes of the Himalayas. At its origin in Tibet, the Chinese call it the Yarlung Tsangpo. The river
enters India through Arunachal Pradesh at which point it is known as the Siang River. From there
it flows into the plains of Assam where it is known as the Dihang River. The river flows for about
35 kilometers before it is joined by the Dibang and the Lohit Rivers. From here on, it is known as
the Brahmaputra.
28     Biba, “Desecuritization in China’s Behavior Towards its Transboundary Rivers: The Mekong
River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers,” 37; and Upali A. Amarasinghe, Tushaar
Shah, Hugh Turral, and B. K. Anand, India’s Water Future to 2025-2050: Business-as-Usual Scenario
and Deviations, International Water Management Institute - Research Report 123, (Sri Lanka, 2007): 9.
29     Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water Disputes: The Coming Water Wars?” 4-5.
30     Jinshui Cai, “Da xixian’ yinggai shang” [Great Western Route Must Be Executed], Kexue
juece [Scientific Decision-making], December 16, 2016, cited in Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indian
Water Dispute,” 25.
31     The name of the book is Saving China Through the Water from Tibet [Xizang zhi shui jiu
Zhangguo], cited in Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute,” 25.
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task force, and asserted the GWWDP is “not technically feasible in the
foreseeable future, and given the development trajectory of China, it is
neither practical nor necessary.”32
These conflicting indicators have led to an ongoing debate over the
true intentions of Chinese water diversion plans for its western route.
Meanwhile, China officially announced plans to build a network of up to
five massive dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo River for the purpose of generating hydroelectricity—not water diversion. In Fall 2014, it completed
construction of the Zangmu Dam, the first of these hydropower dams
along the Yarlung Tsangpo River. Many in India believe these hyropower dams are the first step in the process to construct the additional
infrastructure needed to divert water in accordance with the GWWDP.33
While it does not appear likely China will go through with its water
diversion plan due to cost and engineering difficulties, there is growing
concern Beijing will change course if its current water-diversion plans do
not resolve its growing water-scarcity problem. Should China proceed, it
would increase tensions with India. This dynamic is all the more worrisome when one examines the linkage between the Brahmaputra River
and national sovereignty.

Driving Factor #3: Sino-Indian Dispute over Arunachal Pradesh

The area in which China’s Yarlung Tsangpo River becomes India’s
Brahamaputra River is called the Arunachal Pradesh. Both China and
India claim this region. This territorial dispute is all the more sensitive because it is linked to the sovereignty of both countries. China
cannot give up its claim without simultaneously weakening its claim of
sovereignty over Tibet, which it took by force in 1950. For India, the
Arunachal Pradesh is the site of a humiliating defeat by the Chinese in
1962.
From China’s perspective, political control over Tibet is a matter of
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security. The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) claims China’s sovereignty over Tibet traces back 700 years
to the Yuan (Manchu) Dynasty.34 Furthermore, the CCP perceives its
sovereignty over Tibet as an essential part of restoring China’s national
pride and security. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Great
Britain exploited China’s weakened condition by recognizing Tibet as an
independent state and negotiating new borders. Shortly after the Qing
Dynasty fell, the government of India, which was still a colony of Great
Britain at the time, hosted a meeting between its representatives and

32     Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute,” 26; and Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water
Disputes,” 5.
33     The argument that China may ultimately divert the Brahmaputra River headwaters is widely
reported in Indian news media. For a good review of the arguments both for and against China’s
commitment to diverting the headwaters, see Jonathan Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indan Water
Dispute;” Hongzhou Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water Disputes;” and “South Asia’s Water: Unquenchable
Thirst,” The Economist, November 19, 2011; Lowe and Silvester, “Water Shortages Threaten Global
Security,” 45; Ananth Krishnan, “China Puts First Brahmaputra Dam into Operation,” India Today,
November 23, 2014, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/brahmaputra-dam-india-vs-china-zangmuyarlung-tsangpo-zangbo-hydropower-project/1/403379.html; and Ramachandran, “Water Wars.”
34     Sperling, Elliot. “Tibet and China: The Interpretation of History Since 1950,” China Perspectives
2009, no. 3 (September 2009): 26.
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those from Great Britain and Tibet in Simla, India. There, they drew up
the borders of a newly independent Tibet in the Simla Accord of 1914.35
This agreement created two sets of borders between India and Tibet,
one on either side of Nepal. The western border, known as the Johnson
Line, divided Kashmir from Tibet, and the eastern border, called the
McMahon Line, divided Arunachal Pradesh from Tibet. Both lines
were named after British diplomats.36 China refused to acknowledge the
agreement because it claimed Tibet was still part of China at the time and
did not have the authority to make international agreements.37 In fact,
the Chinese leadership determined recognition of the Simla Accord, and
its McMahon Line, would imply Tibet was an independent state with
treaty-making powers. This status would undermine the legitimacy of
China’s centuries-long claim of sovereignty over Tibet.38
In this manner, the Arunachal territorial dispute became linked
to a core issue—China’s claim of sovereignty over Tibet. Once China
invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950, both the Johnson Line and the
McMahon Line became contested borders between India and China.

China-India Border with Arunachal Pradesh Outlined39

The Arunachal Pradesh is also the scene of the 1962 Sino-Indian
War during which China wrested more than 20,000 square kilometers
of territory from India and inflicted heavy casualties.40 Since then, the
35     Ramachandra Guha, “The Dalai Lama’s War,” The National Interest 115 (September/October
2011): 47; and Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 59; and Sikri, “The Tibet Factor
in India-China Relations,” 60.
36     Bruce Riedel, “JFK’s Overshadowed Crisis,” The National Interest 120 (July 2012): 55.
37     In fact, during the Chinese Civil War, both the Kuomintang Nationalists and the CCP claimed
all of Tibet as part of China. See Michael Clarke, “Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of
China: History, Causes and Contemporary Challenges,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no.
1 (2013): 112.
38     Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 60.
39     “South Asia’s Water Unquenchable Thirst.”
40     The Indian government acknowledged the loss of more than 7,000 personnel—with 1,383
dead, 1,696 missing in action, and 3,968 captured. See Gyanesh Kudaisya, “Beyond the ‘Himalayan
Pearl Harbor’,” History Today 62, no. 11 (Nov 2012): 3.
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dispute over the Arunachal Pradesh remains a point of contention in
Sino-Indian relations and serves as a potential trigger for renewed military conflict despite a period of warming relations and increased trade
between the two countries.41
Even before President Hu’s historic visit to India in 2006, the
Chinese ambassador to India made a statement on an Indian news
channel asserting Beijing’s claim to the entire Arunachal Pradesh area,
casting a shadow over Hu’s visit.42 To further emphasize this point,
China refused to give a visa to a visiting Indian official from Arunachal
Pradesh on the grounds that, as the region was a part of China, the
official did not need a visa.43 In 2009, China refused to endorse an Asian
Development Bank project in Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that
the area for the project was in China.44
Meanwhile, India continues a steady military build-up in and
around the Arunachal Pradesh. In 2008, when Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh visited the province, he announced a major infrastructure development package, and appointed a retired army chief of staff
to the post of governor. In 2009, India deployed an additional 60,000
soldiers to Assam, near Arunachal Pradesh, bringing the total number
of troops in the area to 100,000. It also built three new airfields in the
Himalayan foothills. In 2014, India announced plans to build 54 border
posts in Arunachal Pradesh. Meanwhile, China has heavily invested in
improving its military infrastructure in Tibet, establishing “five fully
operational air bases, several helipads, an extensive rail network, and
36,000 miles of roads—giving them the ability to rapidly deploy 30 divisions (approximately 15,000 soldiers each) along the border, a 3-to-1
advantage over India.”45
In addition to the military build up on both sides of the border,
incursions into disputed areas are common. The Indian government
reported, from 2012-2015, Chinese soldiers conducted 600 incursions
into disputed areas along the India-China border.46 In recent years, the
Chinese-Indian border has become an increasingly dangerous hotspot,
41     From the 1980s to recently, India and China entered into a period of detente highlighted
with the signing of the “Declaration of Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation”
in 2003 and then the “India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”
in 2005. Despite this, the territorial dispute over the Arunachal Pradesh remained unresolved. See
Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations;” and Sujit Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial
Claims on Arunachal,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 4 (July 2008).
42     Jing-Dong Yuan, “The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st
Century,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 138. Also in 2007, the Chinese Foreign
Minister Yang Jieshi reiterated the PRC’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh during his talks with the Indian
External Affairs Minister Pranab at the sidelines of the G-8+5 meeting in Germany, see Dutta,
“Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” 556.
43     Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 64; and Kerry Bolton, “Water Wars:
Rivalry Over Water Resources,” World Affairs 14, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 56.
44     Sanjeev Miglani, “India, China Take a Measure of Each Other at Border Row Talks,”
Reuters, August 5, 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2009/08/05/india-china-take-a-measureof-each-other-at-border-row-talks/.
45     Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” 572; Selina Ho, “River Politics:
China’s Policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of
Contemporary China 23, no. 85 (2014): 14; Bolton, “Water Wars,” 61; Ben Blanchard, “China Expresses
Concern about Indian Plan to Build Border Posts,” Reuters, October 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/10/30/us-china-india-idUSKBN0IJ14G20141030; and Mohan Malik, “‘Victory
Without Bloodshed’: China’s India Strategy,” The Diplomat, August 20, 2013.
46     Ibid. The Indian government routinely tracks and reports incursions by Chinese military
patrols into various disputed areas India administers and which China claims. This number covers
all of these areas, not just Arunachal Pradesh.
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the net result of this military build up, aggressive patrolling, and border
incursions.

Driving Factor #4: Increasing Political Instability in China

China is facing growing domestic political instability due to an
economic slowdown and rising popular nationalism, making it increasingly difficult for the CCP to pursue national interests objectively in a
non-confrontational manner, especially with issues linked to national
sovereignty and quality of life. In the case of water scarcity, and especially with the case of the Brahmaputra River, both of these dimensions
are present. As water scarcity in China grows, the CCP will find it harder
to ignore the cries for more-drastic solutions, such as diverting the
Brahmaputra River and other transnational rivers, to alleviate the suffering of its people. And, because the Brahmaputra River flows through
a disputed area, the CCP’s ability to make decisions in a collaborative
manner with its neighbors will become even more important.

China’s Slowing Economy

Ever since the economic reforms ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in
the 1980s, the CCP has focused on promoting economic growth to build
its national power and to maintain its legitimacy as China’s ruling political party. This concentration resulted in tremendous economic growth
and rising living standards, but it also increased the income gap between
rich and poor, the expectations by the Chinese people for better services,
and environmental degradation.47
But now, China’s gross domestic product growth is slowing, and an
increasing number of analysts are worried China will enter a prolonged
period of slower growth—or an outright recession. This result would
severely test the CCP’s ability to deal with environmental issues, such
as water scarcity, increased social unrest, and rising popular nationalism. A major contributing factor to China’s declining economy is the
tremendous growth of non-government debt and overcapacity China
has accumulated since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
In response to the 2008 crisis, the Chinese government announced
a major fiscal stimulus package and adopted measures to relax monetary policy.48 A main component of this effort was to encourage local
governments to increase funding for infrastructure and public works
projects.49 In order to raise these funds, local governments looked to
the commercial sector to fund public projects by establishing Local
Government Financing Platforms, which are treated as municipal State
Owned Enterprises under Chinese law.50
Local Government Financing Platforms focus primarily on publicwelfare projects such as affordable- housing construction, infrastructure
47     Randall Peerenboom, “China and the Middle-Income Trap: Toward a Post Washington, Post
Beijing Consensus,” Pacific Review 27, no. 5 (2014): 663.
48     Yinqiu Lu and Tao Sun, “Local Government Financing Platforms in China: A Fortune or
Misfortune?” International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 13/243 (October 2013): 8.
49     Chaoying Qi, James Juniper, and James Xiaohe Zhang, “‘Minsky Moment’ and Financial
Fragility: The Case of China,” The Journal of Developing Areas 49, no. 6 (April 2015): 286; and Gang
Fan and Yan Lv, “Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability: An Analysis of China’s Public Debts,”
Asian Economic Policy Review 7, no. 2 (December 2012): 207-208.
50     Fan and Lv, “Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability,” 203.
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development, social services, and environmental protection. To finance
these projects, local governments provide Local Government Financing
Platforms with capital through the direct transfer of government
revenue, land-use rights, or other real-property assets such as roads and
bridges.51 Local Government Financing Platforms then use this capital
as collateral to obtain the financing they need from Chinese banks to
finance the projects the local governments want them to execute.
This relationship between local government, Local Government
Financing Platforms, and state- owned banks has produced far more
capacity than is demanded by foreign and domestic markets in housing,
steel, cement, construction, iron, and other goods. More than one in five
homes in China’s urban areas are vacant. At the macro level, China’s realestate activity is as much as 20 percent of the gross domestic product. To
put this in perspective, at the height of the US real-estate market prior
to the 2008 crisis, real estate was six percent of the US gross domestic
product. As an indicator of over-investment in construction projects,
China used more cement in 2011-2013 than the United States did in the
entire 20th century.52
Not surprisingly, this rising overcapacity has coincided with extraordinary growth in China’s commercial debt-to-GDP ratio which, in 2015,
exceeded 200 percent of the gross domestic product, almost double the
125 percent reported in 2008.53 When coupled with government debt,
China’s total debt-to-GDP ratio approached 300 percent, according to a
2015 report by McKinsey Consulting.54 Small wonder that on March 3,
2016, Moody’s downgraded its outlook on Chinese debt from “stable”
to “negative.”55
This over-capacity and debt has slowed China’s GDP growth rate.
Its nominal GDP growth rate declined from more than 15 percent in
2011 to around seven percent in 2014, but many analysts believe the
actual figure was closer to four percent.56 This slowdown is problematic
in terms of political stability due to the growing income gap in China, an
uncomfortable irony for a party whose originating ideology was based
on communism. Between 2008 and 2010, the Chinese government dealt
with more than 90,000 protests annually.57 As the economy continues
to slow and social unrest rises, the government will need to resort to
nationalism to maintain political stability. This action, however, will
entail its own risks, especially in the realm of foreign policy.

51     Lu and Son, “Local Government Financing Platforms in China,” 4.
52     Vague, “The Coming China Crisis,” 17; and Ibid., 21.
53     Ye Xie, “China’s Debt-to-GDP Ration Just Climbed to a Record High,” Bloomberg Business News,
July 15, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-15/china-s-debt-to-gdp-ratiojust-climbed-to-a-new-record-high.
54     Richard Dobbs, Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel, and Mina Mutafchieva, “Debt and (Not
Much) Deleveraging,” McKinsey Global Institute Report (February 2015): vi.
55     “Moody’s Cuts China Outlook on Eve of NPC, Cites Reform, Fiscal Risks,” Reuters, March
3, 2016, http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/idINKCN0W408K?irpc=932.
56     Vague, “The Coming China Crisis,” 22; and Qi, Juniper, and Zhang, “‘Minsky Moment’,” 279.
57     Elizabeth C. Economy, “Roots of Protest and the Party Response in China,” Testimony before US-China Economic and Security Review Committee, First Session, 112th Congress, February
25, 2011.
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Rising Popular Nationalism in China

Ever since the capitalist reforms under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP
has based its legitimacy on economic growth and nationalist ideology.
In fact, up until the mid-1990s, the party was able to “decide the direction, content, and intensity of Chinese nationalism, and then to mobilize
the people…[it] could appeal to nationalism whenever it so wished, and
dismiss it whenever it needed to shift its policy.”58
A slowing economy and rising popular nationalism are impacting
a leadership that is more exposed to public opinion than ever before,
and constraining the ability of China’s political elites to coolly pursue
China’s national interests. The CCP originally supported this rising
wave of popular nationalism in the 1990s, when a series of incidents
contributed to the perception the West (with Japan included) harbored
ill intentions toward China: the selling of advanced fighter planes to
Taiwan; the search of a Chinese cargo ship; opposition to China’s bid to
host the 2000 Olympics; the accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy in
Kosovo; and Japanese claims on the Diaoyu Islands, denouncing China
in the name of human rights, and the deployment of aircraft carriers in
the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait.59
In the past, when rising popular nationalism threatened national
interests, Chinese leaders applied pragmatic controls, at times constraining or promoting depending on the national and political interests at
stake. For example, at the height of the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, the Chinese government took measures to halt them because the
growing size and publicity of the protests influenced the government’s
foreign policy interest in maintaining productive relations with Japan.60
In the words of a prominent Chinese scholar, “Talking tough but acting
in a calculated manner helped Chinese leaders prevent the rise of popular
nationalism from damaging China’s relations with the United States and
Japan.” The CCP also took steps to halt anti-US demonstrations after
the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo, as
well as the 2001 mid-air collision between a US EP-3 and a Chinese jet
fighter in the South China Sea.61
China’s ability to exert this pragmatic control of popular nationalism
has declined since the 2008 global financial crisis and the slowdown of
China’s economy. As Chinese elites lose the ability to leverage economic
growth to maintain legitimacy, they will become more unwilling, or even
unable, to control popular nationalism. China’s current president and
party leader, Xi Jinping, is particularly exposed to nationalist opinion
because of the way he has consolidated power. Prior to assuming office
as president in 2012, he witnessed the “collective presidency” which
distributed power across the CCP Standing Committee and constrained
58     Zemin Chen, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of
Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 50.
59     Peter Hays Gries, “Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?” Current History (September
2005): 252; and Chen, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 50.
60     Shuisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The
Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 540.
61     Ibid., 542; and Ibid., 540. Actions by the CCP to tamp down Chinese protests concerning
Japanese claims over the Diaoyu Islands are another example of the central government’s ability to
constrain nationalism when needed. See also Phillip C. Saunders and Erica S. Downs, “Legitimacy
and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter,
1998-1999): 139.
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then-President Hu Jintao’s influence so completely he was nicknamed
the “woman with bound feet.” To reverse this, Xi surrounded himself
with “a shadow cabinet that was defined less by a single ideology than
by school ties and political reliability.”62
Xi has limited collective leadership and marginalized traditional
institutions of governance, and he relies on a small group of advisors who
are more loyal than experienced. The National Security Commission, for
example, is led by two figures loyal to Xi, but who have little foreign
policy experience. And with regard to foreign policy decision-making,
Xi has reduced the roles of the State Council, the Foreign Ministry, and
the military.63 He has consolidated so much power, he is personally at
the center of every major policy decision, and is arguably China’s most
authoritarian leader since Mao.64
Because Xi established such clear dominance in the national decision-making process, it has left him with near-total responsibility for
the government’s economic policies. As these policies continue to prove
ineffective in reversing China’s declining economic growth, Xi becomes
more exposed to popular nationalism as he will have to “address countless domestic challenges for which he is now explicitly accountable,” and
a major misstep on any of them could be costly to his political popularity
and position.65
As Xi and his small group of policymaking elites continue to grapple
with declining economic growth and rising social unrest, concerns
over political instability will become a driving factor for foreign policy.
“For this reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese
nationalism—long a pillar of the state’s legitimacy—to compensate for
the political harm of a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt
rivals who might use nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish
his own image.”66 This is evidenced by his development of an image as
an assertive strongman, not unlike that of President Putin to whom Xi
reportedly said in 2013, “We are similar in character.”67
As water scarcity continues to grow in China due to over-consumption, climate change, and pollution, rising popular nationalism will
pressure the CCP to seek drastic solutions. Water diversion of rivers
originating in Tibet will become more attractive to the detriment of
China’s relations with its downstream neighbors.

Conclusion

This article examined a diverse set of factors when assessing the
relationship between water insecurity and war. It is not enough to focus
purely on the dynamics of how water is shared, how water scarcity is
growing, or how the overall natural environment is deteriorating. War,
as a human and a political endeavor, is a more complex matter.
62     Evan Osnos, “Born Red,” The New Yorker (April 6, 2015).
63     Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign
Policy Under a Powerful But Exposed Leader,” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report 74 (February
2016): 6.
64     Evan Osnos, “Born Red.”
65     Blackwill and Campbell, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage,” 10.
66     Ibid., 4.
67     Evan Osnos, “Born Red.”
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Consequently, water scarcity, by itself, will most likely not lead to
war. However, water insecurity when coupled with other factors, such as
increasing water scarcity at the source of transnational rivers, threatening behavior by the upstream state, overlapping linkages between water
insecurity and national sovereignty, and decreasing political stability in
the upstream state, will increase the likelihood of war. In the case of
China and India, all these conditions exist.
So why should the Department of Defense care? It should care
because history has shown the United States could be drawn into a war
between these two powers. On November 19, 1962, when the SinoIndian War was at its worst point for India, Prime Minister Nehru wrote
two letters to President Kennedy describing India’s situation as desperate and requesting comprehensive military aid. He specifically asked for
a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic fighters, radar support, and
US Air Force personnel to man them.68 Although the United States did
not provide direct air support to India, probably having to do with the
timing of the request being on the heels of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it
did send C-130s, laden with military equipment and ammunition, and
dispatch the USS Enterprise to a nearby location.69
The Department of Defense should also recognize Tibet’s impact
to regional security as it becomes the strategic high ground of Asia for
fresh water due to increasing glacier melt; growing water consumption
in China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; and increasing pressure for
China to divert water away from its downstream neighbors. While this
article covered these issues with regard to China and India, the same
lessons learned can apply to countries in Southeast Asia.
As water becomes increasingly sought after among states in that
region, and even around the globe, it is time for the United States and
the Department of Defense to elevate environmental security issues to
a level on par with national security interests such as countering WMD
proliferation and preventing attacks on the homeland. It is increasingly
important to promote confidence-building measures between certain
states to ensure military missteps do not aggravate territorial sovereignty
issues like the one over the Arunachal Pradesh. Finally, it is time for the
Department of Defense to invest in more water purification/treatment
capabilities so it is not focused only on sustaining the health of US and
coalition forces, but also on mitigating water shortage crises.

68     Kudaisya, “Beyond the ‘Himalayan Pearl Harbor’,” 4.
69     Riedel, “JFK’s Overshadowed Crisis,” 56.

